The North Korean government just never gives up. In October it announced its intention to test nuclear weapons. I hope this remark was just another bluff to gain leverage with the Untied States, though as a result of these statements I have started to really rethink whether our hard-line approach is an acceptable solution. Fortunately, a world-class expert on North Korea, Selig Harrison, will be speaking on this issue at the Wisconsin Historical Society this Thursday at 4 p.m. I hope everyone interested in Korean affairs will attend.
Selig Harrison has made a career as a journalist covering Korea. Last year he published the book, \Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement,"" which is an attempt to solve the often thought unsolvable problem. Harrison is also director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy. His talk is part of Korea Peace Day activities (http://www.asck.org).
As I have argued in this column before, the North Korean government under Kim Jong-Il is almost certainly the most despicable in the world. I was therefore secretly pleased when President Bush included North Korea as part of the axis of evil. However, I now realize such phrasing has been diplomatically damaging and counterproductive. Instead, we must work to change the North Korean government in a way that does not militarily threaten its existence. Otherwise it will feel compelled to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense.
To achieve this goal, I believe we must first partially disentangle the United States from Korean affairs by decreasing the massive American military presence in South Korea. This will force other countries to become more involved in negotiations and will lessen the perception that this is a confrontation between just North Korea and America.
There is no reason why we must continue to station tens of thousands of troops in South Korea, which is a modern state that can afford to provide for its own defense. The South Korean economy completely dwarfs that of the North. Moreover, the out-of-date military equipment of the North could not compete with modern arms that are available to the South.
Troops removed from South Korea, along with those still needlessly stationed in Germany, could be used to ease the strain on troops serving in other countries, such as Iraq or Afghanistan. Moreover, the South Korean people increasingly oppose the large presence of American troops on their soil. By partially removing our army we would improve relations with the South Korean public.
I was thus initially pleased to read that Rumsfeld had ordered a pullback of some of our troops from the demilitarized zone this summer-until I recently read Selig Harrison's opinion in the article ""Finding A Way Out With North Korea"" which appeared in the New York Times June 7, 2003.
In this interview Harrison describes the Pentagon's move as ""doing the right thing for the wrong reasons and in the wrong way."" He notes that the pullback was conducted ""to have greater flexibility when and if they decide on military action against North Korea."" I had assumed that military options were not even being seriously considered due to the vulnerability of Seoul to artillery attack. In this context, North Korea understandably perceived the pullback as a threat.
Harrison also notes that we passed up an excellent opportunity to swap troop pullbacks with North Korea, thus alleviating tensions at the border. He is absolutely correct that that these pullbacks should be used to create trust between the United States and North Korea, not to further aggravate the situation.
We should also work to create a non-aggression pact with North Korea. Since military options should be off the table, I see no reason why we should not use a non-aggression agreement as a bargaining chip.
Another possible incentive we can offer North Korea is an easing of economic sanctions. This must be done carefully, though, to avoid swelling the coffers of the government while leaving the people starving.
Increasing trade could also have the added benefit of connecting North Korea to the rest of the world. Harrison points out that the North Korean government is unlikely to fall anytime soon because of the people's almost complete lack of outside contact. These outside influences were vitally important in overthrowing the communist governments of Eastern Europe.
The Bush Administration's hard-line approach does not appear to be curbing North Korea's nuclear aspirations. Instead, negotiations with North Korea must be a delicate balancing act between condemning its totalitarian practices and providing it with the incentives to stop producing nuclear weapons.
