From all appearances, preparations for an invasion of Iraq are fast approaching the point of no return. If any proof of this is needed, one need look no further than the Bush administration's complete rejection of Iraq's latest promise to readmit weapons inspectors.
This refusal is somewhat understandable'Saddam Hussein has evaded Security Council resolutions before, and there is no evidence to suggest that he would not do so again. Nevertheless, the administration probably squandered the last opportunity to ascertain the nature, location and amount of weaponry held by Saddam Hussein's forces without a massive invasion of Iraq. Moreover, even though the probability of successful inspection operations is low, it certainly would not have hurt to go to the well one last time.
Think about it: If the Iraqi government were to shock the world and actually live up to its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687, the U.N. inspectors would find and oversee the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction'and the potential threat would be eliminated. If, on the other hand, Hussein decided to dance again, then the criticisms of Russia, France, Germany and several member-states of the Arab League would completely evaporate. Consequently, an international military coalition would be easily assembled, and Hussein would be forcibly removed from power.
Either way, the principal objective of our foreign policy would be achieved in full. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction would no longer be a threat either to the United States or to its interests abroad. Saddam Hussein would no longer have the capability to harm anyone'or, indeed, to provide international terrorist organizations the ability to do great harm. Yet, the administration passed this chance up.
The refusal of Iraq's offer is, as I said, understandable. But that fact does not obviate the administration's error in judgment. In its shortsighted quest to depose Saddam Hussein, they have set the United States on a course for an ill-advised war.
The reason why I believe the war to be wrongheaded comes from the lack of answers to a critical question'one which has been lost in the shuffle of the last week. The president still has not explained why forcible regime change, by an overt and massive invasion, is the best way to deal with the problems posed by the Hussein government. This question cuts straight to the heart of the matter, as success depends not on the fall of Hussein's regime, but by the after effects of that result.
The inquiry has been posed several ways in the past week. Consider the concerns of Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., senior Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee. In an article by Alison Mitchell, which appeared in the New York Times, he rightly called Hussein \an absolute menace."" Yet, he asked, ""will the people dance in the streets or will they be resentful?""
There is no clear response to Skelton's concerns, since the answers depend entirely upon the progress of the war. If the war is quick and relatively bloodless, Iraqis could greet the fall of Hussein with some amount of euphoria and relief. However, as an international force settles in for a probable post-war occupation of Iraq, that public sense of joy might begin to fade away'particularly if the post-war government is seen as nothing more than an American puppet.
Now, if the war drags on, or if there are a large number of civilian casualties, then the end result could be greeted in Iraq with less enthusiasm. And consider the wider Islamic world as well: Political leaders, fundamentalist clerics and the Islamic news media could, jointly and severally, view the war as a continuation of American imperialism. This would stoke the current anti-American sentiment among the general population and'most important of all'could motivate a select few to join international terrorist groups. If this occurs, then any success we would have in Iraq would be success in name only.
Other Congressional leaders have expressed concerns that are similar to Skelton's. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-SD, offered a particularly deft inquiry by suggesting to Mitchell that an American preemptive strike against Iraq might provide a consequential precedent to India, and thereby might further destabilze the Indian-Pakistani conflict.
These specific questions, along with the more general inquiry into the overall aftermath of the war, have gone unanswered by the administration. Of course, the White House is seemingly uninterested in answering questions; they have already determined that Saddam Hussein is evil and, consequently, that he must be eliminated. But the administration, in its haste to remove a tyrant, might be creating a cure worse than the disease.
